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Populism, International Courts, and Women’s
Human Rights
NIENKE GROSSMAN†

Since Donald Trump was elected President of the United States,
and the United Kingdom chose to “brexit,” many international
lawyers and scholars have spiraled into somewhat of an existential
crisis. What of the rule of international law or universal human rights
when, as Candidate Trump declared upon accepting the Republican
Party’s nomination, “Americanism, not globalism, will be our
credo”?1 His populist “America First” refrain, combined with
subsequent policy decisions withdrawing the United States from
treaties and suspending participation in international bodies, led to
doubts and questions about the relevance and resilience of the postWWII global order, characterized by a commitment to human rights,
multilateralism, and international institutions.
Despite frequent informal discussion and occasional
international law scholarship on populism, its contours are often
vague or conceptualized in such a way as to support a particular
author’s arguments.2 Also, populism’s impact or potential impact on
specific categories of international institutions or stakeholders is
infrequently the subject of inquiry. Few scholars have evaluated how
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populism interacts with state behavior in relation to international
courts and tribunals, or quasi-adjudicative bodies.3 Further, it appears
no scholarship thus far focuses on the impact of populism on the
international legal rights of a particular group as mediated through
these bodies. Such analysis may deepen our understanding of the
extent to which populism can undermine these international
institutions, as well as populism’s potential impact on specific
subnational or transnational stakeholders’ international legal rights.
This contribution to the Maryland Journal of International Law’s
symposium on populism aims to begin to explore the impact
populism may have on gender equality, or more specifically,
women’s human rights, as mediated by international courts and
quasi-adjudicative bodies interpreting human rights law. In other
words, it considers the extent to which populism is potentially
harmful or helpful to women’s human rights, as articulated by these
institutions. Prominent scholars of populism have argued that
populism is a gender neutral concept.4 Cas Mudde and Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser propose that although populism is often associated
with machismo, male leaders, predominantly male electorates, and
sometimes sexist policies, populism has no real link to gender.5
Instead, they assert, “the gender politics of populist actors are
influenced by a combination of the national culture and
accompanying ideology rather than by populist ideology itself.”6
Asking the “woman question” about populism and international
courts may be useful to bring to light hidden biases and assumptions
in both law and institutions.7 Examining the impact of populism on
the rights of one marginalized group may shed light on its impact on
other such groups as well.
Does populism pose a threat to women’s human rights as
mediated by international courts and quasi-adjudicative bodies? Part
I begins by showing that, despite populism’s highly contested
meaning, it is inherently anti-institutional and anti-pluralist.
Consequently, populist governments are predisposed to reject or
3. But see Lawrence R. Helfer, Populism and International Human Rights Law
Institutions: A Survival Guide 1–28 (iCourts, Working Paper No. 133, 2018); Erik Voeten,
Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 1–16
(June 20, 2019).
4. Cas Mudde & Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Vox Populi or Vox Masculine?
Populism and Gender in Northern Europe and South America, 49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE
16, 16–17 (2015).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Katherine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
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challenge international court interpretations of women’s human rights
that do not reflect the views of “the people” addressed by populist
rhetoric. The extent to which populism will harm women’s human
rights, however, depends on at least two questions, discussed in Parts
II and III, respectively: do populists share a regressive view of
women’s human rights, and how likely are they to inflict harm on
international courts and quasi-adjudicative bodies in response to
controversial decisions?
Part III also discusses some steps
international actors can take in response to populist challenges. Part
IV concludes the essay.
I. POPULISM IS INHERENTLY ANTI-INSTITUTIONAL AND ANTIPLURALIST.
Because populism is inherently anti-institutional and antipluralist, populist governments are likely to ignore international
courts or quasi-adjudicative bodies’ judgments that do not reflect
their approach to women’s human rights. The concept of populism is
among the most highly contested in the political science literature,
where much of the academic work on populism is found.8 It has
been defined as a discourse, an ideology, a kind of leadership, a
strategy, and a style, among others, and some argue that the concept
is so vague as to lack utility.9 Somewhat surprisingly, authors rarely
take the time to explain or define populism in the international law
literature, despite its contestation in other fields of inquiry.10 When
scholars do seek to define populism, three approaches predominate:
ideational populism, populism as a political strategy, and populism as
a style.11
Perhaps the most favored definition of populism is the ideational
one.12 Cas Mudde argues that populism is a “thin-centered ideology
that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the
8. Kurt Weyland, Populism: A Political-Strategic Approach, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 67 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017); Cas Mudde,
Populism: An Ideational Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 27 (Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017).
9. Id.
10. See supra note 3.
11. Niels Spierings et al., Gender and Populist Radical-right Politics: An Introduction,
49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 3, 7 (2015); Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggard, Paulina
Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of
the Art, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 13-14 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al.
eds., 2017).
12. See, e.g., Voeten, supra note 3.
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corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression
of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”13 In his bottomup view, populism is rooted in morality; the people should be heard
because they are “authentic,” while the elite, although drawn from
“the people,” has put its own special interests above them.14 It is a
“thin” ideology because it generally does not offer or provides few
specific views on how society or politics or economics should be
arranged to promote the well-being of “the people,” and it is often
paired with a host ideology to provide such content, such as
nationalism or socialism.15 Who makes up “the people” and “the
elite” depends on the manifestation of populism involved.16 Some
populists may root their definitions of these terms in nationality or
ethnicity, while others focus on class or educational differences.17
Mudde rejects, however, Ernesto Laclau’s argument that “the people”
and “the elite” are merely “empty signifiers” meaning nothing at all.18
In this version of populism, the populist leader, as the “vox
populi” or the voice of the people, must separate him or herself from
the elite and represents the authentic voice of the people.19 Mudde
and co-author Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser assert that while populism
is democratic, in that it involves popular sovereignty and majority
rule, populism is inconsistent with liberal democracy, which includes
independent institutions focused on protecting fundamental rights and
minorities, and preventing “tyranny of the majority.”20 Populism
rejects pluralism, minority rights, and the institutions that promote or
protect them, because the will of the people reigns supreme.21
Kurt Weyland, on the other hand, adopts a political-strategic
approach to populism and rejects the idea that populism is a
particular ideology or discourse.22 Populism, in his view, is “a
political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or
exercises government power based on direct, unmediated,
uninstutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized
13. CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 6 (2017); See also Mudde, supra note 8.
14. Mudde, supra note 8, at 29–30.
15. Id. at 30–32.
16. Id. at 32–33.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 32.
19. MUDDE & KALTWASSER, supra note 13, at 68.
20. Id. at 80–81.
21. Id. at 81.
22. See generally Weyland, supra note 8.
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followers.”23 For Weyland, populism is not bottom-up; it’s top-down.
The charismatic leader identifies the “will of the people” and uses it
to mobilize and direct followers.24 A hallmark of populism is the
direct and personalized connection between the leader and the people,
often through mass rallies and media, and without cold institutions or
procedural mechanisms getting in the way.25 Populism is by
definition personalistic, opportunistic, and flexible, and therefore,
movements rooted in ideological purity do not qualify as “populist”
and tend to stay on the margins of political life.26 Weyland rejects
ideational or discursive definitions of populism, in part, because of
their democratic valence; in his view, populism is more concerned
with the leader’s power, rather than the people’s will.27 In the same
vein, populist leaders brush away or seek to diminish the leverage of
other actors – including established elites, political parties, and civil
society – who may seek power for themselves or to limit populist
leaders’ power.28
Pierre Ostiguy presents a third “socio-cultural” or relational
approach, which, in many ways builds upon Weyland’s work.29
Rather than viewing populism as a top-down or bottom up
phenomenon, Ostiguy views it as going both ways, and containing
both socio-cultural and politico-cultural components.30 It is the
“antagonistic appropriation for political, mobilizational purposes of
an ‘unpresentable Other,’ itself historically created in the process of
a specific ‘proper’ civilizational project,” such as liberalism or
multiculturalism or European integration.31
Populism is
“performative,” in that its politicians bring to light these groups in
“inappropriate” and “transgressive” ways, rather than in accordance
with proper norms of public behavior.32 Populist leaders “flaunt the
low” and desecrate what is considered the “high.”33 High and low
refer to ways of relating to people (socio-cultural) and how to make
decisions in politics (politico-cultural). 34 In the socio-cultural
23. Id. at 50.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 59.
26. Id. at 68.
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id. at 56-57.
29. Pierre Ostiguy, Populism: A Socio-Cultural Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF POPULISM 73 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al. eds., 2017).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 75.
32. Id. at 76.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 78.
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context, “high” means “well-behaved, proper, composed,” while low
includes slang, folksy language, “raw, culturally popular tastes.”35
Importantly, populism is characterized by a specific script
asserting that the authentic voices of the majority of the people are
not heard, and their interests are not safeguarded, resulting in moral
indignation.36 Loudly, publicly, and aggressively pointing to the
“nefarious minority” and mobilizing against it are therefore necessary
populist techniques.37 The minority may include “the oligarchy, the
Jews, a socially dominant ethnic minority, the financial sector, the
immigrants, the liberal elite, white colonizers, or black minorities,
depending on the casting of the social antagonist.”38 In addition,
politico-culturally, “high” means favoring “formal, impersonal,
legalistic, institutionally mediated models of authority,” while “low”
includes “personalistic, strong (often male) leadership,” which is
charismatic and close to “the people.”39 For example, the low is
generally unconcerned with acting in a manner considered improper
by the international community and focuses instead on the
relationship with the people.40
These three predominant theoretical approaches to populism
may have gendered consequences for women’s human rights as
interpreted by international courts. Whichever definition of populism
one chooses, it is likely to result in rejection of decisions of
international courts which expand women’s rights beyond “the
people’s” desires, because all three definitions of populism are antipluralist. Instead, populisms appear to thrive on their exclusivity.
Ideational populism relies on an antipathy between the “pure people”
and the “corrupt elite”; it cannot exist without creating clear
boundaries between them. You are either part of “the people,” or
you are not.41 Populists do not exclude all women from “the people”;
in fact, populists have, at times, taken steps to expand women’s
suffrage, like Juan and Eva Perón in Argentina and Getúlio Vargas in
Brazil42 and increased the percentage of women in representative
35. Id.
36. Id. at 76.
37. Id. at 76-77.
38. Id. at 76.
39. Id. at 81-82.
40. Id. at 83.
41. Jan-Werner Muller, What is Populism?, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, 1, 21
(2016).
42. Karen Kampwirth, Introduction, Gender and Populism in Latin America,
PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1, 4 (2010).
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office.43 Yet populist governments are likely to seek to limit social
progress to what “the people’s” views are on what women’s rights
should be. Further, if a women’s rights or feminist agenda is
considered “elitist,” as opposed to associated with “the people,” the
populist government is likely to demonize decisions or act against
policies that promote it. The political-strategic and socio-cultural
approaches are similarly anti-pluralist. Whatever groups or interests
remain outside the tight relationship between the personalistic leader
and the people, including civil society groups representing the views
of Others in the society, are to be brushed aside. For socio-cultural
populists, the voices of the “authentic” people are ignored, while
“nefarious” minorities are given too much attention.44 To the extent
that feminists or women’s rights activists are part of the “nefarious
minority,” or associated with powerful global forces, they are to be
demonized.
On the other hand, international human rights courts and quasiadjudicative bodies, which find facts and interpret and apply
international human rights law, are rooted in liberal notions of
individual rights. As Laurence Helfer has pointed out, international
human rights bodies are pluralist in nature, and they can serve as
counter-majoritarian backstops to domestic courts.45 International
courts tell states when their domestic laws do not go far enough in
protecting the rights of historically disfavored groups, or when
domestic courts do not apply the law equally to all groups or
individuals in a society, or when the executive branch fails to take
action necessary to comply with supranational human rights
obligations. In interpreting human rights, these bodies have, at times,
issued decisions that expand the rights of the vulnerable or socially
disfavored, and they have utilized interpretive techniques which favor
such outcomes.46 Because of their inherent anti-pluralism, populist
states are likely to reject decisions that expand women’s human rights
beyond the desires of “the people,” as understood by the leader.47
All three approaches to populism are also inherently antiinstitutionalist, which facilitates populist governments’ decisions to
ignore or reject the work of international courts. Populism is rooted
in a personal and direct and unmediated relationship between the
43. See, e.g., Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4.
44. See Ostiguy, supra note 29, at 76.
45. See Helfer, supra note 3.
46. See Id. (discussing the pro hominem principle).
47. See Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts,
Perspectives on Politics, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2, 5, (2019).
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leader and the people, whether top-down, bottom-up or two-way.
Institutions are to be pushed aside when they get in the way of the
leader and the people’s preferences. International human rights
courts, on the other hand, are institutions often located far from
where facts giving rise to a dispute arose and are composed of
international judges elected by several states. Judges are charged
with serving as neutral arbiters of the rights and duties of states and
individuals through application of principles of law and without
regard for majoritarian preferences in a particular respondent state.
The role of international courts and judges is wholly at odds with
populist leaders who seek to effectuate their agendas with no
constraints; populist leaders instead seek “to bend or even break
[institutional] limitations” and erode checks and balances.48 Further,
if populist leaders reject domestic institutions when they counteract
the will of the people, they are even more likely to attack
international ones when they issue unpopular decisions.49 The farther
away the decision-makers are from the true and authentic people and
the more counter-majoritarian their decisions are, the less legitimate
they are likely to be in populist eyes.50
Populisms’ anti-pluralist and anti-institutionalist qualities appear
incompatible with international human rights courts’ commitment to
liberal notions of human rights and role as an impartial countermajoritarian check on power. Nonetheless, whether populism is
harmful to gender equality in the international courts context may
ultimately turn on the extent to which “the people’s” understanding
of women’s human rights is unduly restrictive or regressive.
II. POPULISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Despite their anti-pluralist and anti-institutionalist nature,
populist governments are unlikely to react negatively to international
court decisions on women’s human rights unless they transgress what
“the people” want, as understood by the leader. If a populist
movement favors women’s human rights generally, or some aspect of
women’s human rights, it may embrace court decisions that promote
its vision. On the other hand, if support for women’s human rights is
associated with the elite or a nefarious minority or Other, then
populists will reject court decisions that validate such views.
48. Kurt Weyland, Foreward, in Gender and Populism in Latin America: Passionate
Politics, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS, i, ix-x (2010).
49. See Voeten, supra note 46, at 5.
50. Id. at 7.
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Consequently, whether populism is inherently harmful for women’s
human rights as mediated through international courts depends, at
least in part, on populism’s approach to women’s human rights, or
what “the people” believe about the contours of women’s rights.
Unfortunately, existing social science literature generally does
not evaluate the relationship between populism and attitudes toward
women’s human rights, and the relationship between gender and
populism is understudied,51 especially outside of Europe and the
Americas.52 Nonetheless, to seek to better understand populism’s
potential impact on women’s human rights, this section considers
populism’s (or populisms’) relationship to gender by examining
scholarship on populist parties’ electorate, leaders, platforms, and
rhetoric.
Although not dispositive on a party’s views on women’s human
rights, it is worth noting that men appear to make up a greater share
of voters for European populist radical right parties than women. In
seven Northern and Western Europe countries, populist radical right
parties received more votes from men than from women; about sixty
percent of supporters were men.53 Other parties on the center right,
however, received similar support from men; in other words, populist
radical right parties were not outliers when compared to other parties
on the center right.54 Niels Spierings and Andrej Zaslove found,
however, that gender equality attitudes did not distinguish populist
radical right voters from left- and center-right voters in seven
European countries; instead, anti-immigrant positions were the main
drivers of votes for the populist radical right.55 Interestingly, the
study showed some evidence that individuals with authoritarian or
nativist views paired with beliefs in gay and lesbian rights had a
disproportionately high likelihood of voting for populist radical right
parties in Sweden and Norway.56 In the United States, women voters
preferred Democrat Hillary Clinton over right wing populist Donald
Trump, by a twelve-point margin, while men preferred Trump over
Clinton by a twelve point margin.57 On the other hand, in Latin
51. See Weyland, supra note 47, at viii.
52. Valentine M. Moghadam & Gizem Kaftan, Right-wing populisms north and south:
Varieties and gender dynamics, 75 WOMEN’S STUDIES INT’L FORUM 1, 1 (2019).
53. Niels Spierings & Andrej Zaslove, Gendering the vote for populist radical-right
parties, 49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 135, 147 (2015).
54. Id. at 152.
55. Id. at 152, 154.
56. Id. at 158.
57. Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender,
Education, PEW RES. CEN. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
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America, populists from multiple ideological perspectives have
purposefully pursued the female vote, and sometimes have even
received a much higher percentage of female votes than male ones.58
From a political representation standpoint, males are a
significant proportion of populist leaders, but there have also been
several female ones, including France’s Marine Le Pen, the United
States’ Sarah Palin, Argentina’s Evita Perón, and Denmark’s Pia
Kjaersgaard.59 Many are relatives of male leaders, but several are
not.60 In Northern Europe, men dominate leadership positions in
populist radical right parties, even when the top leader is a woman.61
One study showed populist radical right parties from Denmark and
the Netherlands tended to have lower percentages of women in
national and supranational parliaments than national averages.62 On
the other hand, the representation of women in parliaments in Bolivia
and Venezuela increased after left-wing populists Evo Morales and
Hugo Chávez came to power.63 In Bolivia, the percentage of women
in Morales’s party jumped from 8% to 46%, while in Venezuela,
Chávez’s party had 15% percent women in the 2005 to 2010
legislature, as compared to 2% women in other parties.64
Interestingly, in absolute terms, the percentage of women in populist
parties in the four Northern European and South American countries
studied was quite similar.65
Although scholarship is sparse concerning populist
governments’ views on women’s human rights at the international
level, some exists about their platforms and policies on gender
equality at the domestic level.66 Assessing whether policies are
intended to promote or hinder gender equality or women’s human
rights is challenging because policies may affect women of different
class, social status, economic power, race, and other intersectional
identities in different ways, but they still may provide some insights
into the relationship between gender and populism.
tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education.
58. See Kampwirth, supra note 41, at 15.
59. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 21-22.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 26.
66. See, e.g., Spierings & Zaslove, supra note 52, at 137-38; see also, generally,
Kampwirth, supra note 41.
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Relying on the ideational definition of populism, Mudde and
Kaltwasser found that the relationship of Northern European and
South American populists to gender was influenced by national
culture and the thicker ideology populism was paired with.67 Populist
actors reflected prevailing popular views on gender issues and roles,
thereby adopting masculine positions in South America and a
“gender-equal” approach in Northern Europe.68 Because South
American populisms analyzed were left wing and Northern European
populisms were right wing, however, South American populist
governments were more likely to promote a gender equality agenda
than Northern European ones.69 For example, populist radical right
parties in Denmark and the Netherlands seemed to support gender
equality, but did not make it a high priority and rejected affirmative
steps by states to enhance gender equality, such as affirmative action
or positive discrimination.70 One study of six populist radical right
parties in Western Europe, by Tjitske Akkerman, found they shared a
conservative view of family relations, but varied on opposition and
attention to issues like abortion, public child care funding, and same
sex unions and marriages.71 The same study compared the positions
of populist radical right parties with mainstream conservative parties
and found the former were “without exception considerably more
conservative...” on gender equality and women’s rights.72
Interestingly, since European radical right populist parties are
usually conservative in liberal countries, they support their positions
against abortion or for traditional gender roles by emphasizing liberal
values like autonomy, and sometimes they may accept a liberal law
as a fait accompli.73 Also, some use language about gender equality,
freedom, and gay rights in fighting immigration from Muslim or nonWestern countries, countries they argue discriminate against women
and homosexuals, although they have not proposed policies that
support gender equality or gay rights for immigrants.74 Radical right
67. Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 17.
68. Id. at 19-20.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id. at 27.
71. Tjitske Akkerman, Gender and the Radical Right in Western Europe: a
Comparative Analysis of Policy Agendas, 49 PATTERNS PREJUDICE 37, 48-49 (Apr. 15,
2015).
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. at 56-57.
74. Id. at 58; see also Stefanie Mayer, Edma Ajanovic, & Birgit Sauer, Intersections and
Inconsistencies: Framing Gender in Right-Wing Populist Discourses in Austria, 22 NORDIC
J. FEMINIST & GENDER RES. 250, 250- 266 (2014) (discussing framing of gender in right wing
populist discourse in Austria).
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populist parties in Turkey, Hungary, and Poland have adopted “pronatalist” policies, encouraging women to have more children to
propagate “the nation.”75 In Poland, the right wing populist Law and
Justice Party, among other policy proposals, sought to ban abortion
shortly after taking power, resulting in mass mobilization of women
in opposition.76
Latin American populisms, both left and right-wing, have had a
varied relationship with gender equality or women’s rights policies.
Classical populists, from the 1930s to the 1960s, provided women
with jobs, voting rights, and educational opportunities in several
countries, while neo-populists in the 1980s and 1990s had a more
complicated relationship with second wave feminism, which had
more nuanced demands on topics such as domestic violence,
sexuality, and reproductive rights.77 While some populist leaders,
like Nicaragua’s Arnoldo Alemán, attacked feminists as “elites,”
others sought to incorporate them into their coalitions, like Peru’s
Alberto Fujimori, who helped create electoral gender quotas,
appointed women to cabinet positions, and expanded access to
contraception.78 At the same time, he and several of his health
ministers have faced criminal charges for presiding over a forced
sterilization policy affecting thousands of Peruvian indigenous
women.79
In the third wave of populism in Latin America, leaders like
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales promoted
women’s rights in some significant ways, yet limited its reach in
others.80 For example, Venezuelan and Bolivian left-wing populist
platforms included explicit language about the importance of the
rights of women, openly discussed the importance of gender equality
in promoting revolutionary agendas, and pushed for and achieved
constitutional and legislative change.81 Morales had a more complex
relationship with self-identified feminists, however, who were
75. See Moghadam & Kaftan, supra note 52, at 7.
76. Bogumila Hall, Gendering Resistance to Right-Wing Populism: Black Protest and a
New Wave of Feminist Activism in Poland?, 63 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1497, 1497 (2019).
77. See Kampwirth, supra note 41, at 3-6.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Kira Kay, Peruvian Women Alleging Forced Sterilization Seek Justice, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Apr. 28, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/peruvian-women-allegingforced-sterilization-seek-justice.
80. See Kampwirth, supra note 41, at 7; see generally, Stéphanie Rousseau, Populism
From Below: Gender Politics under Alberto Fujimori and Evo Morales, in GENDER AND
POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA 140, 150-58 (Karen Kampwirth, ed., 2010).
81. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 29-30.
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perceived as linked to foreign NGOs and the United Nations, and
therefore, distinct from indigenous women’s interests.82 When
different groups of women – indigenous, lower class and rural
women vs. liberal, middle-class and urban women – took different
views on women’s rights policies, Morales chose not to take a
position in the debate.83 Chávez created a new National Institute for
Women by presidential decree, which presided over several women’s
groups and included longtime feminists, and the Chávez government
promoted policies to lessen domestic burdens and to create new
opportunities for public participation for poorer women.84 At the
same time, some Venezuelan feminists have expressed concerns that
new policies have not changed the basic patriarchal structures in
Venezuela.85 Overall, Kurt Weyland argues that populist leaders in
Latin America may be more comfortable with “feminine” rather than
“feminist” demands. While feminine demands “seek specific,
practical improvements for women while taking their basic insertion
in society and family as given,” feminist demands are concerned with
achieving strategic reforms “to guarantee women autonomy and
equality.”86
In the United States, the right-wing populist Trump
administration has taken explicit steps to undermine women’s human
rights, at least in regard to reproductive and sexual health. Several
human rights bodies charged with interpreting and applying
international human rights law, have determined that access to such
healthcare for women is a human right.87 Nonetheless, at a 2019 UN
82. See Rousseau, supra note 79, at 157.
83. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 31.
84. Sujatha Fernandes, Gender, Popular Participation, and the State, in GENDER AND
POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA 202, 204-5, 209, 218 (Karen Kampwirth ed., 2010).
85. See, e.g., La Clase, Feminist Struggles in Venezuela: An Interview With Comadres
Púrpuras
(Part
II),
VENEZUELANALYSIS.COM
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14127.
86. See Weyland, supra note 47, at xi.
87. See, e.g., CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention
(1999); K.N.L.H. v. Peru, CCPR Communication No. 1153/2003 (2005),
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003 (finding, by the UN Human Rights Committee, that Peru violated
adolescent girl’s right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, when a Peruvian hospital forced her to carry an
inviable fetus to term; Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez (1 Feb. 2013), A/HRC/22/53, paras.
45-50; Paulina del Carmen Ramirez Jacinto v. Mexico, Inter-American Commission on
Human rights, Petition 161-02, Report No. 21/07, Friendly Settlement, para. 19 (9 March
2007) (“The Commission also underscores that women cannot fully enjoy their human rights
without having a timely access to comprehensive health care services, and to information
and education in this sphere.”); Risa E. Kaufman, Commission on Unalienable Rights and
the Effort to Erase Reproductive Rights as Human Rights, 4 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
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summit, U.S. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services Alex Azar declared that the United States and eighteen other
countries, many with problematic human rights records, wished to
eliminate reference to terms such as “reproductive health and rights”
in UN documents because they may “undermine” the family and
promote abortion.88 In addition, the State Department began omitting
information about availability of abortion, access to contraception,
maternal mortality, and discrimination against women in health care
from its human rights reports, resulting in complaints from civil
society groups and members of Congress.89 The US also threatened
to veto a UN Security Council resolution on sexual violence in
conflict unless language calling on UN bodies and donors to provide
“sexual and reproductive health” assistance to survivors of sexual
violence was cut.90 In March 2019, the US announced it would
reduce $210,000 in funding to the Organization of American States,
amounting to 5% of US funding for the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights, because of its alleged advocacy of abortion rights,
although only one of its 253 press releases in 2019 concerned
abortion.91
ONLINE 1, 3 (2019).
88. Alex M. Azar II, U.S. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Remarks on
Universal Health Coverage, U.N. General Assembly Press (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2019-speeches/remarks-onuniversal-health-coverage.html. The other countries were: Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq, Libya, Mali,
Nigeria, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
89. Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, Lawmakers and Civil Soc’y Pressure Dep’t
of State to Bring Back Deleted Reprod. Rights Sections in Annual Human Rights Reports
(Oct. 3, 2018), https://reproductiverights.org/press-room/lawmakers-and-civil-societypressure-department-state-bring-back-deleted-reproductive; Letter from Members of
Congress of the United States to U.S. Sec’y of State Mike Pompeo (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/10.1.18%20%20House%20of%20Representatives%20Pompeo%20Reproductive%20Rights%20Letter%
20Final%20w%20signatures.pdf.
90. Michelle Nicols, Bowing to U.S. Demands, U.N. Waters Down Resolution on Sexual
Violence in Conflict, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-war-rapeusa/bowing-to-us-demands-un-waters-down-resolution-on-sexual-violence-in-conflictidUSKCN1RZ27T. After the revised resolution was passed, the French Ambassador to the
UN decried the watering down of the resolution: “It is intolerable and incomprehensible that
the Security Council is incapable of acknowledging that women and girls who suffered from
sexual violence in conflict - and who obviously didn’t choose to become pregnant - should
have the right to terminate their pregnancy.” Id.
91. Carol Morello, Pompeo Cuts OAS Funds over Advocacy of Legal Abortion, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/pompeo-cuts-oas-funds-over-advocacy-of-legal-abortion/2019/03/26/4ea5314dd7e0-48de-b636-e552447430b0_story.html?noredirect=on; Doug Cassel, Human Rights,
Diplomatic
Wrongs,
HARVARDILJ.ORG
(Apr.
28,
2019),
https://harvardilj.org/2019/04/human-rights-diplomatic-wrongs/.
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Populist leaders also frequently use gendered rhetoric.92 In Latin
America, masculinity and a macho style are “hallmarks” of most
populist leaders, but populist leaders also depict women as essential
actors in social change.93 Both Morales and Chávez seemed to speak
about women as both important political actors and as maternal
figures who sacrifice on behalf of others. 94 At the same time, Chávez
often exalted his sexual prowess and homophobic beliefs, and
Morales plays up gossip on his sexual affairs with women.95 In the
United States, President Donald Trump has made statements calling
attention to the size of his genitals,96 as well as used misogynist
language on multiple occasions.
He has insulted women’s
appearances, referred to women as animals, such as pigs and dogs,
publicly mocked their bodily functions, including urination and
menstruation, and made fun of the weight and shape of women’s
bodies.97 Across the Atlantic, Mudde and Kaltwasser found that
Northern European parties did not have a particularly sexist or
masculine discourse, but Eastern and Southern European parties did.98
Pia Kjaersgaard, a long-time female leader of the Danish right wing
populist party spoke out explicitly against the feminist movement and
argued that its demands for gender equality have gone too far.99
Interestingly, when arguing against Islamic immigration to Europe,
however, right wing populist parties have used gendered rhetoric
about preserving women’s rights and preventing “Islamic gender
apartheid.”100 Elzbieta Korulczuk and Agnieszka Graff argue that in
recent years, illiberal populists in Poland and across the globe are
increasingly and actively promoting an anti “gender ideology”
discourse, in which leaders argue that individual rights must be
92. Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 34.
93. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 33.
94. Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 34; see also Rousseau, supra note 79, at 154.
95. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 34; see also Rousseau, supra note 80, at
155.
96. At a 2016 Republican debate, he said: “Look at those hands. Are they small hands?
And he [Marco Rubio] referred to my hands if they’re small, something else must be small,"
he said. "I guarantee you there’s no problem. I guarantee you.” Nick Gass, “Trump on small
hands: ‘I guarantee you there’s no problem,’” Politico (March 3, 2016), at
https://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/2016/03/donaldtrump-small-hands-220223.
97. Michael D. Shear & Eileen Sullivan, ‘Horseface,’ ‘Lowlife,’ ‘Fat, Ugly’: How the
President
Demeans
Women,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/16/us/politics/trump-women-insults.html.
98. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 32.
99. Susi Meret, Charismatic Female Leadership and Gender: Pia Kjaersgaard and the
Danish People’s Party, 49 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 81, 96 (2015).
100. See Mudde & Kaltwasser, supra note 4, at 28.
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replaced with the rights of the traditional family as a basic unit of
society, and that religious conservatism is under attack.101 Feminism
or gender equality movements are perceived as “powerful and foreign
‘colonizers.’”102 From the left wing, Evo Morales has argued that
colonialism has negatively affected gender relations, for example, by
asserting that machismo is a foreign import, and that Bolivia should
return to indigenous norms on gender relations instead.103
The relationship between populism and policies promoting
women’s rights is challenging to disentangle. In much of the existing
research, populism is variously or vaguely defined, making
generalizations about populism’s relationship to gender and women’s
rights difficult to draw. Authors who do rely explicitly on a specific
definition of populism rarely show or describe how populism
operates apart from other kinds of social or political phenomena or
what the impact of populism is, as distinguished from populism
paired with a specific or thicker ideology, such as nationalism or
authoritarianism or left-wing socialism, or even nationalism,
authoritarian or socialism in the absence of populism.
Yet some (tentative) conclusions can be drawn. At a minimum,
right wing populist parties are less likely to promote women’s rights
or gender equality at the domestic level than third wave left-wing
Latin American populists. In some instances, right wing populist
governments have taken steps actively to curtail women’s rights at
the domestic and international levels, such as by attacking women’s
health and reproductive rights. Left wing populists appear more
motivated to address gender inequality than right wing populist
movements, and they have introduced legislative and even
constitutional reforms to this end. Populist leaders of all stripes may
be less willing to accede to demands aimed at increased autonomy for
women, or which challenge traditional understandings of family
structures or patriarchy. Some populist leaders, especially outside of
Northern Europe, use macho language when speaking about women,
while they still may recognize them as political partners. Although
right wing politicians have used women’s rights language to seek to
exclude Muslim immigrants, criticism of feminism as damaging to
local, traditional gender relations appears more common. The
populist narrative of the antipathy between the authentic “people”
101. Elzbieta Korolczuk & Agnieszka Graff, Gender as ‘Ebola from Brussels’: The
Anticolonial Frame and the Rise of Illiberal Populism, 43 J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND
SOC’Y 797, 798-99 (2018).
102. Id. at 799.
103. Rousseau, supra note 79, at 154.
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and the “other” may make feminism and women’s rights easy targets
for populist ire, as liberal ideals such as human rights and
universalism can be reframed as efforts by foreign powers to impose
foreign values on unsuspecting and unwilling local communities.
The populist rhetorical strategy of “flaunting the low,”104 either by
discussing sexual prowess or sexual affairs or insulting women does
not necessarily directly affect women’s rights, but it may create an
environment where such discursive behavior becomes normalized
and may affect the way populations view their obligations to ensure
women are not subject to sexual assault or other abusive behavior.
III. CAN POPULIST GOVERNMENTS CAUSE HARM TO INTERNATIONAL
COURTS?
Populism’s relationship to gender may predispose some populist
leaders against international adjudicative decisions that protect,
reinforce or expand women’s human rights. But what actions will
they take in response? And if they seek to undermine international
courts, how likely are they to succeed? Rejecting or challenging
international court decisions that counter-act domestic public opinion
is nothing new, and it is certainly not limited to populist
governments. Scholars have been struggling with what drives states
to comply with or ignore international court rulings for many years.105
More recently, scholars have attempted to systematize attempts to
influence international courts and forms of resistance to international
courts, such as verbal critiques, non-compliance, exit, or attempts to
terminate a court.106
They have also distinguished between
“pushback,” or reacting negatively to some legal development and
seeking to reverse it within the system, versus extraordinary
“backlash,” questioning the authority of the court itself and aiming to
transform or close the court.107 Despite the dearth of research on the
nature of populist governments’ reactions to unpalatable international
104. Ostiguy, supra note 11.
105. See, e.g., KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS 20-21 (2013); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 290 (1997); James L.
Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions:
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 459 (1995);
CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (2004).
106. Mikael Rask Madsen et al., Backlash Against International Courts: Explaining the
Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT 197,
213 (2018).
107. Id. at 202-03.
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court or quasi-adjudicative body decisions, there is reason to believe
populist governments favor backlash over pushback.
As discussed above, prevailing definitions of populism are antiinstitutional.108 Philip Alston proposes populists are particularly
dangerous to the human rights movement because they are
comfortable with flaunting their disdain of social conventions.109
They are willing to break rhetorical and legal boundaries previously
left undisturbed, including long-held assumptions about
multilateralism and human rights. Eric Posner argues that criticizing
international courts is part and parcel of the populist challenge to
international institutions associated with the post-WWII liberal order,
which in their view, is run by disconnected elites and the nefarious
establishment.110 In a first empirical work on the relationship
between populism and backlash on international courts, Erik Voeten
found that eighteen of twenty-eight backlash episodes against
international courts originated from populist leaders. 111
Although backlash against international courts and quasiadjudicative bodies is considered “very rare,”112 a number of
examples exist in recent years of populist governments exiting,
undermining and attacking them. For example, Venezuela’s President
Chávez denounced the American Convention on Human Rights and
withdrew Venezuela from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
following an unfavorable court decision and several clashes with the
Inter-American System of Human Rights.113 Populist presidents in
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela joined together in an
effort to move the headquarters of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights out of the United States, to restrict discretionary
spending, and to limit the role of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Expression.114 Although framed as an effort to reform and
108. See supra Part I.
109. Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 1, 4
(2017).
110. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalism and the Populist Backlash, 49
ARIZ. ST. L. J. 795, 796 (2017).
111. Voeten, supra note 45, at 8.
112. See generally, Madsen, Cebulak & Wiebusch, supra note 105, at 217.
113. Díaz Peña v. Venezuela, preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. c) No. 244 (June 26, 2012); Timothy Gill, Venezuela Says ‘Adios’ to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 11, 2013),
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2013/0911/Venezuelasays-adios-to-the-Inter-American-Court-of-Human-Rights.
114. See AQ Editors, Venezuela Officially Withdraws from Human Rights Body,
AMERICAS
QUARTERLY
(Sept.
10,
2013),
https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/venezuela-officially-withdraws-human-rights-

GROSSMAN

122

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 35:104

strengthen the Inter-American System, many of the countries
promoting these changes had received great scrutiny for human rights
violations, and human rights groups and think tanks warned these
proposals were dangerous to the Commission’s work.115
While the Obama Administration blocked the reappointment of
a member of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body in May
2016, citing disagreement with his on-the-record questions and
decisions, the Trump Administration raised broader concerns about
Appellate Body members’ continued service on pending appeals after
their terms expired, as well as other concerns about deviance in
Appellate Body reports from WTO rules, and it blocked numerous
proposals for reform or to fill vacancies.116 Rather than engaging
with proposed amendments, the United States has “responded with
disinterest” and failed to explain its disagreement with proposals.117
Starting in January 2020, only one member of the Appellate Body
remains in office, leaving the multilateral trade system’s dispute
settlement regime on the verge of collapse.118
The Trump
Administration has also interacted with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights in unprecedented ways for the United
States. It failed to appear at hearings for the first time in history,119
failed to lobby for its own nominee to the Commission, resulting in
the second time in history that the United States candidate lost an
election,120 contributed zero dollars in voluntary contributions to the
body.
115. Mari Hayman, ALBA-Backed Proposals for IACHR Reform Could Undermine the
System,
WORLD
POLITICS
REV.
(Mar.
27,
2013),
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12821/alba-backed-proposals-for-iachrreform-could-undermine-the-system; Inter-American Dialogue, Rule of Law Working Paper,
Michael Camilleri & Danielle Edmonds, An Institution Worth Defending: The InterAmerican Human Rights System in the Trump Era at 2 (June 2017),
https://www.thedialogue.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/IACHR-WorkingPaper_Download-Resolution.pdf.
116. United States Continues to Block New Appellate Body Members for the World Trade
Organization, Risking the Collapse of the Appellate Process, 133 AM. J. INT’L L. 822, 82326 (2019).
117. Id.
118. World
Trade
Organization,
Appellate
Body
Members,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm.
(last
visited
January 28, 2020).
119. Editorial Board, An Abdication on Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/opinion/an-abdication-on-humanrights.html?searchResultPosition=5.
120. See Doug Cassel, Human Rights, Diplomatic Wrongs, HARV. INT’L L. J.,
https://harvardilj.org/2019/04/human-rights-diplomatic-wrongs/
(“Senior
Department
officials lifted nary a finger to win the election.”). The first time was in the George W. Bush
Administration, when a politically well-connected candidate with little background in human
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Commission’s limited budget in 2018, and subsequently, seriously
considered defunding the Commission entirely for supporting
women’s rights to reproductive health.121 To the extent populist
governments favor backlash, these examples show how a populist
government’s displeasure with one or a series of decisions has the
potential to impact meaningfully an entire international court or
quasi-adjudicative body and the legal regime it interprets and applies.
When populist governments have powerful tools within a
specific international court system, like the ability to block the
appointment of adjudicators, withdraw significant amounts of
funding, or mobilize powerful allies, successful backlash is likely
more feasible.
At the same time, even powerful populist
governments face challenges in transforming displeasure into facts on
the ground. Terminating an international court—the gravest form of
backlash—is a collective effort, which requires agreement among
multiple member states.122 Populist governments have a tough time
cobbling together multilateral reform coalitions because of their
“thin” ideologies.123 Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
were ultimately unsuccessful in their efforts to persuade OAS
member states to move the Inter-American Commission outside the
United States or to limit external funding for the Special Rapporteur
on Freedom of Expression.124 In examining backlash episodes in
three different African regional courts, Alter, Gathii, and Helfer
found that consensus voting rules, too, presented obstacles for states
seeking to modify a court’s jurisdiction and access; following rules
and internal procedures for change required agreement of multiple
states and gave tempers a chance to cool.125 In addition, states need
broad agreement of both substantial international and domestic actors
to torpedo a court successfully.126 To shift from pushback to
backlash, more than mere disagreement of experts or strong
government resistance is needed; broader campaigns and public
mobilizations provide the requisite support.127 Without domestic and
rights lost the election. See also Camilleri & Edmonds, supra note 113, at 5.
121. Cassel, supra note 119; Press Release, IACHR, IACHR Presents Accountability
Report
for
2018
Budget
(Mar.
14,
2019),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2019/067.asp.
122. Madsen, Cebula & Wiebusch, supra note 104, at 204.
123. Voeten, supra note 45, at 2.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against
International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27
EURO. J. INT’L 293, 295, 318 (2016).
126. Madsen, Cebula & Wiebusch, supra note 104, at 204.
127. Id. at 205.
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international backing, populist states may still choose other forms of
resistance, such as exiting a particular court, failing to comply with a
court’s decision, or denouncing it in public forums. While these
steps certainly can negatively affect international courts, they are less
extreme than terminating or effectively blocking the functioning of
an adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative body.
States and other actors appear to have multiple tools at their
disposal in responding to populist backlash. Mobilizing both
domestic and international constituencies to block harmful actions
against these bodies is one important strategy, since states need
public support at the domestic level and multilateral support at the
international level to engage in successful backlash.128 Karen Alter,
James Gathhi, and Laurence Helfer attributed disparate outcomes in
response to controversial decisions in three African regional courts to
variations in the mobilization of secretariats, civil society, and subregional parliaments.129
Secretariats, composed of a political
appointee and professional staff, can serve as backstops to backlash
efforts when professional and independent, and they can also create
opportunities for meaningful civil society awareness and
engagement.130 Sub-regional parliaments, when more than just “talk
shops,” can also play a role in supporting international bodies
through resolutions and interaction with the courts themselves, if
appropriate.131 Ensuring that these bodies have strong institutional
procedures and consensus practices may also enhance their resilience
in the face of backlash.132 The nature of other states’ and
international organizations’ responses and their leverage over
populist states may help determine the effectiveness of backlash as
well.
In the case of women’s human rights, domestic and transnational
civil society may be of particular importance. Both domestic and
transnational constituencies have strong interests in responding to
efforts to hobble bodies interpreting women’s human rights, both for
the sake of women’s human rights, and for the sake of protecting the
human rights system as a whole. For example, in response to efforts
to defund the Inter-American Commission for allegedly supporting
abortion rights, a group of former US Commissioners and nominees
sought to explain why funding the Commission was consistent with
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 204; see also Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 123, at 321.
Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 123, at 295.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 325.
See generally Alter, Gathii & Helfer, supra note 123.
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federal law,133 Democratic senators wrote to U.S. Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo in support of funding,134 and fifty domestic and
international nongovernmental organizations decried the negative
impact that defunding the Commission would have on human rights
in the region.135 Soon thereafter, Pompeo announced cuts of 5% in
US funding, but did not eliminate all funding for the Commission.136
Although empirical data is sparse, the inherent anti-pluralist and
anti-institutional characteristics of populism and recent actions by
populist governments in response to unpopular decisions suggest
populist governments may shift easily from pushback to more
dangerous backlash. Identification of tools for responding to
backlash, and populist backlash specifically, and enhancing the
resilience of international bodies, requires more scholarly and
practical attention. Nonetheless, consensus-based rules for reform,
mobilization of domestic, transnational, and international
constituencies, and the leverage of other non-populist states may help
to prevent lasting harm, depending in part on the relative power and
resources of populist governments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Populism’s impact on women’s human rights as mediated
through international courts is potentially both significant and
harmful. Populism, in its many and varied forms, is noteworthy for its
anti-pluralism and anti-institutionalism. Demonizing foreign judges
who render counter-majoritarian decisions disconnected from “the
people” fits easily within the populist narrative. While much remains
to be learned about the relationship between populism and women’s
rights, the existing literature suggests most populist leaders are, at
133. Letter to Secretary Pompeo from former US Commissioners and Nominees (Feb. 13,
2019),
https://theglobalamericans.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/Pompeo.IACHR_.2.13.19.pdf.
134. Letter from Senators to Secretary Pompeo (Feb. 26, 2019), at
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/_cache/files/a/2/a2983189-e980-4cf9-86328fede6400861/252450FADFC7D144B60851E5BF5388FD.02-26-19-engel-sires-menendezcardin-letter-to-pompeo-regarding-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights.pdf.
135. Press Release, 50 Civil Society Organizations and Experts Join Calls for Continued
US Funding of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ROBERT F. KENNEDY HUMAN
RIGHTS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://rfkhumanrights.org/news/50-civil-society-organizations-andexperts-join-calls-for-continued-u-s-funding-of-inter-american-commission-on-humanrights.
136. See Carol Morello, Pompeo Cuts OAS Funds Over Advocacy of Legal Abortion,
WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/pompeo-cuts-oas-funds-over-advocacy-of-legal-abortion/2019/03/26/4ea5314dd7e0-48de-b636-e552447430b0_story.html?noredirect=on.
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least, likely to disfavor international court decisions that advance
women’s rights in substantial ways. Populist leaders of varying
political stripes have linked feminist demands for autonomy or to
dismantle patriarchy to a transnational, non-autochthonous, nefarious
“elite,” rather than “the people.” They have utilized misogynist and
sexualized rhetoric, insulting women’s dignity and demeaning their
status as equal rights holders in society, likely boding ill for rightsexpanding efforts. Further, right-wing populist governments,
particularly outside of Northern Europe, are associated with
retrogressive approaches to gender equality, especially around the
issue of sexual and reproductive health and autonomy, and some have
taken concrete steps to limit women’s reproductive health and
promote pro-natalist policies.
When dissatisfied with a court’s decision, populist governments
appear predisposed to engage in backlash rather than pushback alone,
endangering women’s human rights – and human rights more
generally. Although more research is needed, at least one empirical
study and qualitative analysis show efforts by populist governments
to harm institutions, rather than simply push back against a specific
unpopular decision.137 While some argue that populist critiques may
lead to much needed reforms to these institutions, concrete real-world
examples of such noble motives appear few and far between.
Instead, a lack of engagement in real reform attempts at best, and
efforts to terminate or narrow the jurisdiction of these bodies,
potential defunding of bodies, and blocking of their functioning, at
worst, appear more common. Populist governments seem more
interested in burning down the house than building a new addition or
remodeling the kitchen.
Whether populist governments succeed in their backlash
depends on a number of factors, including their relative power and
resources. States, transnational, and international constituencies
seeking to protect these institutions from populist backlash are welladvised to take action to enhance their resilience, by ensuring
consensus rules exist and are followed, and secretariats and
transnational constituencies maintain regular and open lines of
communication. In the face of backlash, domestic, transnational, and
international constituencies must stand ready to mobilize in response.

137. See supra, Part III.

